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Abstract 
We study stochastic differential games in a bounded domain D in Rd with a smooth boundary 
BD. Let U, be s compact m e k c  space which is the control set of the player t, i = 1,2. Let 
V, = P(U,), the space of probability measures on U,. We consider a dynamic system evolving 
in = D U8D according to the following stochastic differential equation 
H(t> = b(X(t), v1(t), v2(t)) dt + a(X(t)) dW(t) - 7(X(t)) W ) ,  
4(t) = 1 {c(t) E aD } dm, t t 0, 
X(0)  = x E D, t(0) = 0, 
where 
b : n x & x G - + I R d ,  
dehed  by 
- 
b : x Ul x Uz -+ ELd the drift vector, a : + Rdxd the diffusion coefficient, 
7 : b + '8, a smooth vector field, 
W ( 0 )  is a &dimensional standard Wiener process, v, (-) is e V,-valued nonanticipative process 
cded an admissible strategy of the player t, i = 1,2. The state X(t) is a reflecting diffusion 
in controlled by the processes (vl(-), v2(-)). When X(t) hits the boundary aD, it d e c t 8  
inward dong the vector field 7. The continuous process c(-) increases only when X(-) hits 
aD. Let A,, i = 1,2, denote the set of all admissible strategies for player s. 
In zero-sum game with the above dynamics we consider two payoff criteria: a-discounted 
and long-run average payo&. Let 
be the payoff function. When the &ate is at z E 25 and player i chooses action os, E U,, s= 
1,2, then player 1 receives a payoff ~ ( x , u l , m )  from plqyer 2. The playem have strictly 
opposite interests; the player 1 wishes to rn8lcir.k his total income whereas the plsyer 2 
wbhestorninimizethesame. L e t r : ~ x f i x ~ - + R b e d e h e d a a  
Let (q, y) E Al x A2. The a-discounted payoff to player 1 for the initial condition x E b is 
defined as 
A strategy v i  E Al is said to be a-dsscounted ophmal for player 1 for initial condition x if 
for any & E Az. 
Debe  the function &, : + EL by 
The function &, is called the ahdsscounted upper value funchon of the game. 
A strategy v,' E A2 is said to be ahdsscounted optarnal for player 2 for initial condition x if 
for asy GI E A1. 
Define the function El, : -+ IR as follows: 
The function dl, is called the o!-dsswunted lower value finchon of the game. UP%(*) n &(a), 
then the game is said to admit a value for discounted criterion and the common function is 
denoted by R, and is called a!-dsscounted d u e  finchon. 
Let (vl, v2) E A1 x A2. The long-run average payoff ( or ergodic payoff) to the playa 1 for 
the initial condition x E is defined as 
The long-run average optimal strategies and the value function are defined in a similar 
manner as the discounted case. 
To establish the existence d s value for the a-dkounted payoff we consider tbe 
corresponding Isaac8 equation given by 
&(x) = id sup [ ~ ' l l w ( ( x )  + r (x ,  V I ,  Q)]  in D, 
ur 1 
= -sup inf [ L " ~ ~ ~ ) ( X )  + r (x ,  q, 4 )  in D, 
vrEV1 *Eh I 
84 
- = 0 on OD, 
07 
Under certain assumptions on b, a, r , we show that the a-&counted value function is 
the unique solution m a certain class of functions of the above Isaacs equation We also 
characterize the optimal strategies for both players using the Isaacs equation. For ergoQc 
payoff cnterion we derive d o g o u s  results. 
For nonzero-sum case we study both a-discounted and average payoff criteria. Let T, . 
x Ul x U2 + lR, i = 1,2,  be the payoff function for player a. When the state is x E a 
and the player s chooses action u, E U,, then player s receives a payoff Fl. Each player tries 
to maximize his total income. 
Let r, : x Vi x &. + R be dehed as 
Let (vl, v2) E Al x A2. Then a-discounted payoff to the player i, = 1,2, for the initial 
condition x E is defined as 
A pair of admissible strategies (v;,v;) E A1 x Az is said to be an a-d~counted (Nwh) 
equtlibrium for the initial condition x E if 
The above inequality shows that if a player uni la tdy  deviates from a Nash equilibrium, 
then he ie going to be a h e r .  Let (wl,w) E A1 x A2. The long-run average (or ergodic) 
payoff to the player C for the initial condition x E 'I5 is g i m  by 
1 
4 [ v 1 , 4 ( 4  = l p k f  q ~ [ / r  o ~~(x(t) ,v1(t) ,~2(~))aflx(o) =XI.
The Nash equlibrium for long-run average payoff is defhed analogous to the discounted case. 
For each criterion we establish the existence of Nash equilibria. 
We develop a numerical method to obtain the value function and optimal strategies for 
the players xn the zer+sum game. We prove the convergence of the value function and 
the optimal strateps of the discretized game to that of the onginal differential game. We 
impliment our numerical method to a game of &heries exploitation. 
